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Abstract:Theoretically, there are regulatory dynamics that can be identified, namely: first, the 
urgency of applying the 20% presidential threshold to the 2019 presidential and vice 
presidential election; and second, is the implication of regulations on political parties in 
proposing candidates for president and vice president who do not get 20% of seats in the DPR 
based on the results of the 2014 general election. The constitutional dynamics that developed in 
setting the threshold of 20% in the 2019 presidential and vice presidential elections were first, 
the determination of the 20% threshold in the 2019 presidential and vice presidential election 
was the mandate of the legislation and the Constitutional Court's ruling. In addition, to 
strengthen the presidential system. Second, the 20% threshold requirement in the 2019 
presidential and vice presidential nomination is contrary to the 1945 Constitution and is 
considered threatening to electoral democracy and the existence of political parties. 
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Introduction 
A. The Contemporary Issue of Presidential Threshold 
 
The dynamics of the emergence of a struggle of thought towards the material test related to the 
presidential threshold (presidential threshold) 20 percent in Law No. 17 of 2017 concerning the 
Election was sued again by the group who refused the presidential threshold of 20 percent namely 
Busyro Muqoddas, Muhammad Chatib Basri, Bambang Wijayanto, Hadar Nafis Gumay, et al. with 
both have legal standing. Some of the reasons presented by them are first, Law No. 7 of 2018 
concerning General Elections is contrary to the 1945 Constitution which is clearly stipulated in Article 
22e paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the 1945 Constitution. The articles in the 1945 Law and UUD are 
contradictory so that they need to be materialized. Second, the constitutional rights of political parties 
to nominate themselves as presidential candidates from each party or a combination of political parties 
will be disrupted due to the existence of Law No. 7 of 2018 concerning General Elections[1]. 
The provisions of the presidential threshold in the electoral system leave a polemic in the 
governance system in Indonesia. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 14 / PUU-
XI / 2013 which was decided on January 23, 2014 concerning the testing of Article 3 paragraph (5), 
Article 9, Article 12 paragraph (1) and paragraph (2), Article 14 paragraph (1) and Article 112 Law 
Number 42 of 2008 concerning the Election of the President and Vice President proposed by Effendi 
Ghazali stipulated that the implementation of the DPR, DPD and DPRD elections and the election of 
the president and vice president must be held simultaneously in the 2019 elections. The Constitutional 
Court granted several articles tested by the applicant, one of which was the simultaneous election. The 
Posita submitted by the Petitioner in his petition explained that the applicant considered the existence 
of a Presidential Election held after the implementation of legislative elections (pileg) was not in 
accordance with the mandate of Article 22E paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia.[2] 
Described, in accordance with Article 6a paragraph 2 of the Presidential Election Law, 
political parties must nominate vice presidential candidate pairs before the election, where the 
intended election is in accordance with the provisions of Article 22e paragraph 1.2, and 3 of the 1945 
Constitution, namely the election of members of the DPR, DPRD and DPD . In the 1945 Constitution 
it is stated that Indonesia adheres to the presidential system. In the presidential system, presidential 
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elections should be held first before parliamentary elections. But in practice, in the Presidential 
Election Law the election of DPR members was held before the presidential election. Article 22e of 
the 1945 Constitution clearly states that elections are held to elect members of the DPR-DPD, 
President-Vice President and DPRD. He also stressed that the election constitution was held once in 
five years. 
The applicant assesses that with two elections, the budget for holding elections will be more 
wasteful. In addition, with elections that are not simultaneous, the ease of citizens to exercise their 
right to vote efficiently is threatened. So that if the Pilpres and Pileg are held simultaneously, the 
voters will exercise their right to vote intelligently and efficiently. The application for the petition 
rejected by the Constitutional Court is about constitutionality Article 9 of the Presidential Election 
Law. The Constitutional Court Judge stated that the provisions of the presidential threshold are the 
norms of a congress regarding open legal policy delegated by Article 6A paragraph (5) of the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The legislative election with the presidential election in 
2019, of course the implementation of the threshold must refer to the results of the previous legislative 
elections, namely the results of the 2014 legislative elections. 
 
B. The Origin of Presidential Threshold Concept  
The Presidential threshold is the threshold for political parties or a combination of political 
parties for the submission of a president or vice president. The Presidential threshold of 20-25% 
requires political parties or a combination of political parties that want to nominate president and vice 
president must have at least 20% of seats in the DPR or 25% of nationally valid votes in the previous 
election. In the 2014 election, there were 12 parties participating in the election. Presidential 
Threshold is the threshold for political parties or a combination of political parties to submit 
presidential or vice presidential candidates.[3] As mandated in Article 222 of Law Number 7 of 2017 
concerning General Elections which reads: 
Candidate pairs are proposed by political parties or a combination of political parties participating 
in the election that meet the requirements for obtaining seats at least 20% (twenty percent) of the 
number of seats in the DPR or obtain 25% (twenty five percent) of legitimate votes nationally in 
previous DPR member elections. 
General Election is a means of people's sovereignty to elect members of the House of 
Representatives, members of the Regional Representative Council, members of the Regional People's 
Legislative Assembly and to elect the President and Vice President, which are carried out directly, 
publicly, honestly and fairly in the Republic Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution 
of the Republic of Indonesia. General Election is a means of people's sovereignty to elect members of 
the House of Representatives, members of the Regional Representative Council, members of the 
Regional People's Legislative Assembly and to elect the President and Vice President, which are 
carried out directly, publicly, honestly and fairly in the Republic Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 
1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.[4] 
One consequence of a democratic legal state is that every filling of government positions at 
every level must be carried out democratically through general elections, hereinafter referred to as 
elections. General elections as a consequence of a democratic state are regulated in Article 1 paragraph 
2 of the 1945 Constitution (1945 Constitution). Elections as a means for the people to channel their 
political rights to vote and be elected must be carried out properly and must be in accordance with the 
principles of the state of law in accordance with the constitutional foundation as stipulated in Article 
22E of the 1945 Constitution of NRI, namely: General elections are held to elect members of the 
People's Legislative Assembly, Regional Representative Council, President and Deputy President and 
Regional Representatives. It also includes general elections to elect the President and Vice President 
as stipulated in 
Article 6A paragraph (1) and (2) stating: "The President and Vice President are elected in one 
pair directly by the people" and "The pairs of candidates for President and Vice President are proposed 
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by political parties or a combination of political parties participating in the general election before the 
general election." 
a. Presidential Threshold Base on UUD NRI 1945 
As explained above, the state constitution has been amended several times based on the spirit of 
Indonesian reformation. The first period of the amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia began in 1999 and the second period in 2000, but the two provisions have not been amended 
in terms of filling in the position of head of state. Then in the third change there are several provisions 
related to the conditions for becoming president and vice president and the mechanism of direct 
election by the people. The provisions referred to are stated in Article 6A of the 1945 Constitution of 
the Republic of Indonesia. Please note that the initial debate in amending the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia was inseparable from the direct or indirect discussion of the electoral system. 
become president and vice president. [5] 
Article 6A of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia does not mention the 
provisions for the threshold for nominating the president and vice president / presidential threshold, 
but based on the provisions of Article 6A paragraph (5) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia which states that; "The procedure for the election of the President and Vice President is 
further regulated in the Law." Our State Constitution provides constitutional authority to the 
Government together with the House of Representatives to make more comprehensive rules regarding 
the procedures for the implementation of presidential and vice presidential elections because in the 
Constitution NRI 1945 does not contain detailed and concrete material related to the contents. Then a 
law was drafted on the presidential and vice presidential elections which contained the provisions of 
the Presidential Threshold. This is a political agreement between several factions in the House of 
Representatives with the consideration that in order to create a strong and effective presidential system 
the requirements for submitting president and vice president based on the number of legitimate 
national votes are needed by political parties or a combination of political parties as proof of the 
legitimacy of the people. [6] 
b.   Presidential Threshold After Decision of Mahkamah Konstitusi 
 Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections is the latest regulation related to electoral 
ratification in the plenary session of the House of Representatives (DPR) of the Republic of Indonesia 
in the early hours of July 21, 2017. Legal instruments that have reaped polemic regarding the 
presidential threshold (threshold for parties politics or a combination of political parties to submit 
candidates for president or vice president) contains 573 articles, explanations, 4 attachments, and are 
listed in several books; The first book is about General Provisions, the second book about Election 
Organizers, the third book on Election Implementation, the fourth book on Election Violations, 
Election Process Disputes, and Election Result Disputes, and the fifth book on Election Crime, and the 
Sixth Closing Book. This law was promulgated by the Minister of Law and Human Rights, Yosanna 
H. Laoly on 16 August 2017. 
Regarding the threshold for political parties or a combination of political parties to submit a 
presidential or vice-presidential candidate, this law confirms that candidates for President and Vice 
President are proposed in 1 (one) pair by political parties or a combination of political parties that 
meet the minimum requirements 20% (twenty percent) of the total number of seats in the DPR RI or 
obtaining 25% (twenty five percent) of legitimate votes nationally in the previous election of DPR 
members. Political parties or a combination of political parties as intended can only nominate 1 (one) 
candidate pair in accordance with the internal mechanism of political parties and/or joint deliberations 
of political parties carried out democratically and openly. This is clearly stated in Article 221 - Article 
223 of Law No.7 of 2017 which reads: 
Pasal 221 : Calon Presiden dan Wakil Presiden diusulkan dalam 1 (satu) pasangan oleh Partai 
Politik atau Gabungan Partai Politik. 
Pasal 222 : Pasangan Calon diusulkan oleh Partai Politik atau Gabungan Partai Politik Peserta 
Pemilu yang memenuhi persyaratan perolehan kursi paling sedikit 2O% (dua puluh persen) 
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dari jumlah kursi DPR atau emperoleh 25% (Dua puluh lima persen) dari suara sah secara 
nasional pada Pemilu anggota DPR sebelumnya. 
Pasal 223 : (1) Penentuan calon Presiden dan/atau calon Wakil Presiden dilakukan secara 
demokratis dan terbuka sesuai dengan mekanisme internal Partai Politik bersangkutan, (2) 
Partai Politik dapat melakukan kesepakatan dengan Partai Politik lain untuk melalokan 
penggabungan dalam mengusulkan Pasangan Calon.(3) Partai Politik atau Gabungan 
Partai Politik sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (2) hanya dapat mencalonkan 1 (satu) 
Pasangan Calon sesuai dengan mekanisme internal Partai Politik dan/atau musyawarah 
Gabungan Partai Politik yang dilakukan secara demokratis dan terbuka. (4) Calon Presiden 
dan/atau calon Wakil Presiden yang telah diusulkan dalam satu pasangan oleh Partai 
Politik atau Gabungan Partai Politik sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (3) tidak boleh 
dicalonkan lagi oleh Partai Politik atau Gabungan Partai Politik lainnya. 
Regarding this question, the Court was of the opinion that there was no fundamental reason 
that caused the Court to change its position. Because: [7] First, the Constitutional Court Decision 
Number 53/PUU-XV/2017 was pronounced on 11 January 2018. Meanwhile, the Court's ruling 
regarding the constitutionality of Article 222 of the a quo Election Law was based on comprehensive 
considerations which departed from the nature of presidential government systems according to the 
design of the 1945 Constitution, not on the basis of casuistic considerations that depart from concrete 
events. In the span of only a few months there was no change in the constitutional system according to 
the 1945 Constitution as evidenced by the absence of changes to the law as a further regulation of the 
constitutional system. Thus there is no fundamental reason for the Court to change its position; [8] 
Second, because the establishment of the Court is based on comprehensive considerations 
that depart from the nature of the presidential government system according to the design of the 1945 
Constitution, basically all Petitioners' arguments, even if argued using different testing grounds, have 
themselves been considered in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 53/PUU- The 
XV/2017[9]: 
1. The Petitioners' arguments that the terms of the candidate pair are not open legal policy but that 
close legal policy has been rejected by the Court as stated in the consideration of the Decision of 
the Constitutional Court Number 51-52-59 / PUU-VI / 2008, which is later reaffirmed in the 
Court's decisions next, including in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 53 / PUU-
XV / 2017; 
2. The Petitioners' argument that Article 222 of the Election Law is not constitutional engineering 
but constitutional breaching, the Court has stated that it is constitutional engineering, as explained 
in the consideration of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 53 / PUU-XV / 2017, 
especially in Paragraph [3.14 ] number 4, therefore the Court disagrees with the Petitioners; 
3. The Petitioners' argument that the calculation of the presidential threshold based on the previous 
DPR Election results has eliminated the essence of the election, this matter has also been 
considered by the Court since the Constitutional Court Decision Number 51-52-59 / PUU-VI / 
2008 and further elaborated in the Court Decision Constitution Number 53 / PUU-XV / 2017, 
especially in Paragraph [3.14] number 5; 
4. The Petitioners' arguments that Article 222 of the Election Law should not regulate the 
"conditions" of the Presidential Candidates because Article 6A paragraph (5) of the 1945 
Constitution only delegates "procedures", this argument has also been refuted by the Court 
Decision 51-52-59 / PUU -VI / 2008; 
5. The Petitioners' arguments that the delegation's arrangement of "conditions" of the Presidential 
Candidates to Law is in Article 6 paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution and not related to the 
proposal of Political Parties, this also by itself has been refuted by legal considerations 59 / PUU-
VI / 2008. Moreover, it is difficult to establish a constitutionally coherent argument when on the 
one hand the Constitution explicitly gives a large role to political parties to propose candidates 
for president and vice president, while on the other hand the requirements of the presidential 
candidate are said not to be related to proposals by political parties. This matter has also been 
considered in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 53 / PUU-XV / 2017, specifically 
Paragraph [3.14] number 5; 
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6. The Petitioners' arguments that the presidential threshold removes the essence of the presidential 
election because it has the potential to present a single presidential candidate, even though at first 
glance it seems logical but ignores the fact that the 1945 Constitution does not restrict citizens to 
establish political parties as long as the requirements are fulfilled as stipulated in the law . So, 
even though the parliamentary threshold conditions are applied, the possibility for the birth of 
new political parties will remain open, as evidenced by the empirical facts that have existed since 
the guarantee of freedom of association and assembly, especially after the amendment to the 1945 
Constitution. presidential and vice-presidential candidates, a political party must first be 
registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. For political parties that meet the 
requirements of being registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, to be a participant 
in the general election must also be registered as a general election participant in the KPU by 
fulfilling the more stringent requirements compared to the conditions listed in the Ministry of 
Law and Human Rights. Not only formal requirements, to be a participant in a political party 
election must pass verification starting from the central level to the sub-district level; 
7. The Petitioners' arguments that Article 222 of the Election Law has the potential to produce legal 
uncertainty that must be anticipated by the Court, this is not at all reasonable because the 
formulation of Article 222 of the Election Law a quo does not give room to be interpreted 
differently because it is very clear; 
8. The Petitioners 'argument that the nomination of the President should not be based on the results 
of the previous DPR members' election, this is actually no different from the arguments of the 
Petitioners in number 4 above, so that the Court's consideration as mentioned in number 4 above 
applies to this argument; 
 
C. Presidential Threshold: The Evidence of Democratic Dilemma  
The concept of democracy as a political system cannot be separated from Greek philosophers. 
But in the mid-20th century, the meaning of democracy experienced a paradigm shift: First, 
democracy was defined as a form of government; second, democracy is understood based on the 
source of authority for the government; and third, democracy is one of the procedures for forming a 
government. The main procedure of democracy is the election of political leaders competitively by the 
people through direct elections. Here, Joseph A. Schumpeter defines democracy with the terms "the 
will of the people" (source) and "the common good" (goal). Therefore, according to Schumpeter 
democracy is called a democratic method. The democratic method according to Schumpeter is 
institutional arrangements to arrive at political decisions that are aware of the general good by making 
people decide their own problems through the selection of individuals to gather in order to carry out 
their will. With this description, it shows that democracy can be seen from two dimensions, namely; 
contest dimensions and participation. Democracy also implies the existence of civil and political 
freedom, namely the freedom to speak, publish, assemble and organize which is needed for political 
debate and the implementation of election campaigns. [10] 
In addition to these two dimensions, in the history of democratic theory there is a very sharp 
difference in whether democracy must mean a type of power or a form of representation of power. Of 
these differences, three main types or models of democracy have emerged. First, direct democracy or 
participatory democracy, a system of decision making on public issues where citizens are directly 
involved. Second, there are liberal democracies or representative democracies, a system of 
government that includes elected "officials" who carry out the task of "representing" the interests or 
views of citizens in limited areas while upholding the "rule of law" . Third, democracy is based on a 
one-party model. [11] 
On the other hand, Anthony Giddens calls it direct democracy or participation democracy with 
the term deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy is contrary to liberal democracy or 
representative democracy. According to Giddens, deliberative democracy is a way to reach agreement 
on policies or decisions in the political area desired by society. [12] 
 
D. The Regulatory Implications of Presidential Threshold 
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Based on this ruling it becomes clear that the norm formulation contained in Article 222 of 
Law No.7 of 2017 as stated in the a quo ruling still remains constitutional or in line with the 1945 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The verdict explicitly suggests that Threshold Presidential 
regulation is the authority of legislators In this case, the House of Representatives together with the 
President to regulate the requirements for the vote for Political Parties as a condition to submit 
candidates for President and Vice President in the simultaneous election. 
Jimly Ashidiqie argues that our government adheres to a Presidential system, so that when a 
multi-party system is implemented the results are not a single Political Party in a dominant position. In 
such circumstances, a coalition system that is commonly known in the system of parliamentary 
governance is definitely needed, so that many scholars lack the development of practices in the world 
who think that the coalition system exists only in parliamentary systems. Coalitions in presidential 
systems such as experience in Indonesia include the Joint Secretariat Coalition in the era of President 
SBY's Government and the existence of the Great Indonesian Coalition and the Red and White 
Coalition in the Jokowi Government era and in some Latin American countries that are unavoidable. 
Therefore it is necessary to think about the ideal construction and posture of a presidential system 
coalition like in this country in order to function properly. So in order to realize the quality of the 
simultaneous elections in 2019 in the future, according to Jimly Asshiddiqie, the 2014-2019 period 
needs to be utilized to strengthen the institutionalization of political parties in the long run. With 
plurality that is "segmented" and even "fragmented" (segmented and fragmenteed pluralism) so that 
any "threshold" policy that is applied for the purpose of simplifying the number of political parties 
naturally in the long run the number of political parties in Indonesia will never be reduced to 2 (two) 
dominant political parties like in the United States. Therefore, we must be prepared to accept the fact 
that there are many and no dominant political parties as reflected in the results of the current 2014 
legislative elections. 
Candidate pairs are proposed by political parties or a combination of political parties 
participating in the marriages that meet the requirements for obtaining seats at least 20% (two percent) 
of the DPR seats or obtain 25% (twenty five percent) of legitimate votes nationally in previous DPR 
member elections . Article 222 of Law 7/2017 adds nomination threshold conditions that have the 
potential to eliminate the potential birth of alternative presidential and vice presidential candidates, 
which actually have been fully anticipated even through the second round of presidential election 
system, so the phrase article 222 a quo contradicts article 6a paragraph (3) and paragraph (4) of UUD 
1945. 
Whereas the phrase threshold requirements for nominating presidential and vice presidential 
candidates are stipulated in Article 222, namely: "those who meet the requirements for obtaining seats 
at least 20% (twenty percent) of the DPR seats or obtain 25% (twenty five percent) of valid votes 
nationally in previous DPR member elections "has clearly limited the potential for a more varied 
presence of presidential and vice presidential candidates. Although mathematically, the a quo article 
opens up the opportunity for the presence of several pairs of candidates, but in reality, the article 
which stipulates the tougher and tougher conditions has led to the presence of fewer presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates. ' 
That the phrase a 222 quo Article which encourages the presence of fewer presidential and 
vice-presidential couples who have the potential to be only two pairs as happened in 2014 and may 
repeat in 2019, or even create only one pair of candidates, has clearly contradicted the electoral system 
very anticipatory and complete, which regulates the second round of the presidential election and the 
conditions for determining the winner of the presidential election in Article 6A paragraph (3) and 
paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution. Even though for example, it is argued that the presidential and 
vice presidential threshold requirements in Article 222 Law 7/2017 a quo does not eliminate the norms 
of Article 6A paragraph (3) and paragraph (4), but the fact that the threshold system built is 
encouraging the presence of fewer candidates, and therefore eliminates the opportunity to use Article 
6A paragraph (3) and paragraph (4 ) This is still a constitutional violation, or at least a potential 
violation of the constitution. 
Internasional Conference on Humanity, Law and Sharia (ICHLaSh). November 14-15. 2018 
 
Reconstruction on Sharia Sciences in Facing Contemporary Law Problematics/87 
The requirements for nominating a presidential candidate by political parties are very well 
regulated in the 1945 Constitution so it should be closed legal policy not open legal policy, so the 
phrase article 222 a quo contradicts article 6 paragraph (1), article 6 paragraph (2), article 6a paragraph 
( 1), Article 6a paragraph (2), Article 6a paragraph (3), Article 6a paragraph (4), Article 6a paragraph 
(5), Article 22e paragraph (1), Article 22e paragraph (2), Article 22e paragraph (6 ), and Article 28d 
paragraph (1) of UUD 1945. 
Base on the arguments of the Petitioners who argued that Article 222 of the Election Law 
added that the nomination threshold conditions that have the potential to eliminate alternative 
presidential and vice presidential candidates had been considered even since the Constitutional Court 
Decision Number 51-52- 59 / PUU-VI / 2008 which was later reaffirmed in the decision - next 
decision. These considerations are strengthened by consideration in the Decision of the Constitutional 
Court Number 53/PUU-XV/2017 as can be read in particular in paragraph [3.14] of number 5 of the 
decision; 
Theoretically, there are two further legal consequences that can be identified. First, the legal 
consequences of the pre-election of the President and Vice-President are lawsuit against the KPU's 
decisions, including: determining the stages of the presidential election, determining the candidate 
pairs and procuring goods and services; second, the legal consequences after the presidential election 
are a lawsuit against the validity of the elected President and Vice President. All claims will be 
addressed to the State Administration Procurement in Jakarta, because the locus is in Jakarta. As a 
solution, legally it can be done with the President issuing Perppu to revoke Article 9 of Law No. 42 of 
2008, in which the article contains provisions for a presidential candidate pair and a vice presidential 
candidate pair proposed by a political party or a combination of Election participant political parties 
that meet the minimum voting requirements 20% of the total seats in the DPR or get 25% of the 
national valid votes. If article 9 is deleted or revoked, then the separation of the Pileg and Pilpres is 
valid, because it is in accordance with the norms and article 6A paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution 
First, this Constitutional Court decision will have implications for the birth of the national movement 
rejecting the results of the 2014 Election from the political elite of political parties participating in the 
2014 Election who failed in this election competition, because they feel that Law No. 42/2008 has 
been declared contradictory to the 1945 Constitution and not legally binding, but the reality is still 
used as the basis for the upcoming 2014 presidential election. Moreover, the 2014 Election was not 
carried out simultaneously. In fact, the amendment to the Constitutional Court's decision stated that the 
elections demanded by the 1945 Constitution post-amendment were simultaneous elections not 
separate elections. If the 2014 election is separated between the legislative and presidential elections, it 
automatically loses its juridical backrest. Therefore, it is not impossible that in the future many parties 
will consider the results of the 2014 Election products to be unconstitutional. This movement will 
endanger political stability and will even lead to people's distrust of democratic institutions. 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court's decision will have implications for the need for the DPR 
and the government to immediately prepare various products of the draft law on simultaneous 
elections for the 2019 Election because the simultaneous election requires the regulation of legislative 
elections and codified presidential elections. While today the two laws are separate, the Presidential 
Election Law uses Law No. 42/2008, while the Pileg uses Law No. 12/2012 on the Election of 
Members of DPR, DPD and DPRD. The modification of the two laws is not enough to just 
synchronize between articles, but also harmonize the substance of the value of the implementation 
process and the implementation system. More than synchronization, harmonization and 
correspondence between these two laws and other organic laws that regulate the political field, namely 
the Political Party Law, Election Organizing Law, MPR Law, DPR, DPD and DPRD and the Law on 
Regional Government. Thus, the Constitutional Court's ruling will result in the widening of various 
revisions to other laws. Described, argument that the presidential threshold in Article 222 of the 
Election Law based on the results of the previous DPR Election was irrational, has also been answered 
with the consideration of the Court in number 4 and number 9 above. 
Third, the implications of this Constitutional Court ruling will also encourage the 
improvement of the performance of judges of the Constitutional Court (MK) because the elections are 
held simultaneously, both nationally and locally. As a result, disputes over election results submitted 
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to the Constitutional Court must have increased by 100%. At this point it can be ascertained that 9 
constitutional judges will be overwhelmed in handling disputes over election results. In fact, as 
stipulated in the Election Law and procedural law in the Constitutional Court, the dispute over election 
results is limited in time. Therefore, it is an obligation to review Law No. 23/2004 concerning the 
Constitutional Court as amended by Law No. 8/2011 concerning the third amendment to the 
Constitutional Court Law. This review is aimed at the possibility of increasing the number of 
constitutional judges or establishing election special courts which are under the umbrella of the 
Supreme Court (MA) or the Constitutional Court (MK) and can make their representation in a number 
of provinces as well as criminal acts of corruption. 
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